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Section 371 of the Insurance 
Code.ld 
Finally, the court ad-
dressed the trial court's error in 
not granting Mrs. Matthews' 
request to be maintained on 
Adm. Matthews' SBP, based 
on the characterization of the 
SBP as non-marital property. 
Id Mrs. Matthews argued that 
marriage during a substantial 
period of active duty is not a 
prerequisite to the award of 
benefits under the SBP. Id Ad-
miral Matthews, on the other 
hand, alleged that the SBP, 
which was derived prior to his 
marriage, is not subject to equi-
table distribution, as marital 
property.ld 
Again, the court agreed 
with Mrs. Matthews, but first 
Powell v. Maryland 
Aviation Admin.: 
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determined that the power of 
the court to order a party to 
elect a former spouse as a ben-
eficiary of the SBP does not 
involve the transfer of proper-
ty. Id. at 253,647 A.2d at 817. 
The court then recognized oth-
er court holdings which charac-
terized the SBP as a separate 
and distinct property interest. 
Id, 647 A.2d at 818. In its 
conclusion, the court stated that 
its holding does not require the 
court to characterize the nature 
of the interest involved in the 
case. Id It reasoned that, while 
property gets its form from the 
federal statute, a property right 
is subject to "all conditions of 
the statute which created it." 
Id In this case, the condition 
was the power ofthe state court 
In Powell v. Maryland 
Aviation Admin. , 336Md. 210, 
647 A.2d437 (1994), the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland deter-
mined that an administrative 
agency hearing on employee 
misconduct may use a trial 
court's finding of the individu-
aI's guilt as evidence of the 
misconduct. The criminal find-
ing may not, however, be given 
conclusive effect in such pro-
ceedings. 
A maintenance worker 
at Martin State Airport, David 
Powell ("Powell"), was sus-
pended for threatening a super-
visor. At one of his hearings, 
Powellieamed that a secretary, 
Colleen Holthaus ("Holthaus"), 
to order a service member to 
designate a beneficiary. Id 
Matthews v. Matthews 
interprets 10 U.S.C. § 1450 
(t)( 4) as authorizing Maryland 
courts to compel military ser-
vice members to maintain former 
spouses as beneficiaries of their 
Survivor BenefitPlan. The case 
is significant in that it grants 
state courts additional power in 
the area of family law which 
may be exercised during divorce 
proceedings. The case also rec-
ognizes those unusual circum-
stances in which a former spouse 
may be in need of a measure of 
financial security that would not 
otherwise exist but for the Sur-
vivor Benefit Plan. 
- Andrea E. Moss 
had provided information used 
in the case against him. Follow-
ing the hearing, Holthaus re-
ceived obscene and harassing 
telephone calls which were re-
corded on her answering ma-
chine. She believed the voice 
was Powell's and, subsequent-
ly, the calls were traced back to 
an area of Martin State Airport 
to which he had access. 
Holthaus filed a complaint 
against Powell in the Circuit 
Court for Harford County. He 
was charged and found guilty of 
telephone misuse in violation of 
Article 27, Section 555A of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland 
(1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.). At 
sentencing, Powell was granted 
_____________________________ . '?5."/~.:j£:~~.: ... :~,:.-SS) 
probation before judgment un-
der Article 27, Section 641, 
which provides that upon dis-
charge from probation the per-
son shall not be considered to 
have had a conviction. 
Subsequent to the find-
ing of guilt and prior to the grant 
of probation before judgement, 
the Maryland Aviation Admin-
istration ("MAA") filed disci-
plinary charges against Powell. 
The MAA cited COMAR Sec-
tion 06.01.01.47 as the basis for 
removal from employment. The 
specific grounds included of-
fensive conduct toward fellow 
employees, wards of the State 
or the public; conviction of a 
criminal offense or of a misde-
meanor involving moral turpi-
tude; and, conduct which brings 
the service into public disre-
pute. 
Powell requested that 
the administrative law judge 
(" ALI") and the MAA dismiss 
the charges, reasoning that pro-
bation before judgement did not 
constitute a conviction upon 
which to base charges. At the 
administrative hearing, Holthaus 
and two supervisors testified to 
having identified Powell's voice 
on the answering machine, while 
Powell denied making any calls. 
In resolving the factual conflict, 
the ALJ refused to second guess 
the judge's sentence of proba-
tion before judgement or the 
finding of guilt. The ALJ decid-
ed that the trial judge's finding 
of guilt was sufficient to sup-
port a violation of CO MAR Sec-
tion 06.01.01.47E and M. The 
AU recommended that Powell' s 
employment be terminated. 
Powell filed exceptions 
to these findings with the Secre-
tary of Personnel, who upheld 
the ALJ' s decision. Powell then 
brought his case to the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore County, 
seeking a remand for a de novo 
hearing. The circuit judge grant-
ed the remand, determining that 
the entry of probation before 
judgement in the criminal case 
was inadmissible in the ALJ's 
evidentiary hearing and that the 
factual finding of guilt could not 
be given weight. The MAA 
appealed to the court of special 
appeals which reversed the cir-
cuit court, holding that the pro-
bation before judgement dispo-
sition established the fact ofhis 
misconduct beyond dispute. The 
court declared that Powell had 
received due process and the 
issue of his guilt need not be 
relitigated. Powell was granted 
certiorari by the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland. 
The court of appeals 
recognized their task as one of 
determining whether "a guilty 
finding in a criminal matter 
against a State employee, which 
criminal matter received a pro-
bation before judgement dispo-
sition, [can] be given preclusive 
effect in State administrative 
disciplinary actions taken against 
the employee regarding the same 
incident." Powell, 336 Md. at 
217, 647 A.2d at 440. Before 
the court, Powell argued that 
the circuit court's finding of guilt 
should have no preclusive effect 
in his administrative hearing. He 
asserted alternatively that if the 
finding was to be allowed as 
nonconclusive evidence in that 
hearing, the matter should be 
remanded for a de novo hearing 
before a new ALI In response, 
the MAA did not maintain that 
the criminal finding be given 
conclusive effect, but argued 
that the finding be admissible in 
the hearing as evidence of the 
conduct charged. It also asked 
that if the matter be remanded, 
the resolution of the factual is-
sue be made on the present 
record, without, however, giv-
ing preclusive effect to the guilty 
finding. 
The court began its anal-
ysis by noting that the prior 
finding of guil t was brought forth 
in an administrative hearing, not 
a judicial one. Id.at 218, 647 
A.2d at 441. Since the circuit 
court's decision was only a find-
ing of guilt and not a conviction, 
the principle of nonmutual col-
lateral estoppel would not bar 
relitigation of the fact. Id (cit-
ing Mannan v. District of Co-
lumbia Bd of Medicine, 558 
A.2d 329 (D.C. 1989)). In 
Mannan, the board's decision 
to place complete reliance on a 
circuit court's probation before 
judgment was held in error be-
cause there was no conviction 
and, therefore, no final judge-
ment upon which to base the 
preclusive effect of the plea or 
findings underlying the plea. Id 
(citing Mannan, 558 A.2d at 
338). 
Based on Mannan and 
other cases, the court deter-
mined that the ALJ had erred in 
giving conclusive effect to the 
finding of Powell's guilt. Id at 
219, 647 A.2d at 441. The 
court held that the ALJ could 
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"second guess" the circuit court 
judge and must review all of the 
evidence to resolve the credibil-
ity dispute between Holthaus 
and her witnesses and Powell. 
Id Accordingly, the court de-
cided that a remand was neces-
sary. Id The court stated the 
general rule for determining the 
admissability of evidence in state 
employee disciplinary proceed-
ings: "The presiding officer may 
admit probative evidence that 
reasonable and prudent individ-
uals commonly accept in the 
conduct oftheir affairs and give 
probative effect to that evi-
dence." Id at 220, 647 A.2dat 
442 (citing the Administrative 
Procedure Act, Md. Code Ann., 
State Gov't Art. § 10-213 (1984, 
1993 Supp.)). 
The court then referred 
to the court of special appeals' 
recognition that a finding of guilt 
underlying probation before 
judgment has probative value. 
Id at 221, 647 A.2d at 442 
(citing Ogburnv. State, 71 Md. 
App. 496, 526 A.2d 614). Re-
ferring to Section 641, the court 
also noted that nothing in the 
statl;lte bars the use of a court's 
finding of guilt as evidence in an 
administrative hearing. Id The 
court determined that Powell's 
dismissal from state employment 
"is not a (disqualification or 
disability imposed by law be-
cause of conviction of crime' 
within the meaning of § 641(c)." 
Id at 221,647 A.2d at 442-43. 
Having disposed of ar-
guments on both sides of the 
issue, the court reversed and 
remanded the case to the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland 
to vacate the judgement of the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore 
County. The circuit court was 
ordered to vacate the order of 
the Secretary of Personnel with 
directions to institute new pro-
ceedings. Id at 222,647 A.2d 
at 443. The court rejected 
Powell's request for the court 
to designate a new ALJ and the 
MAA's request to designate the 
same ALJ, declaring that the 
selection ofthe ALJ was entire-
ly up to the Chief Administra-
tive Law Judge of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings. Id. 
The decision by the court 
of appeals takes a sensible ap-
proach, allowing some weight 
to be given to a court's criminal 
findings in a state administrative 
hearing. Invariably, a state em-
ployee tried for employment-
related criminal misconduct in a 
district or circuit court will be 
brought up on similar charges 
by his own agency. It is reason-
able that the findings of the 
court be given probative value 
in administrative proceedings, 
particularly in light of the court's 
expertise in handling criminal 
cases. At the same time, by 
allowing the findings to be ad-
mitted as evidence, but not as 
conclusive proof of misconduct, 
the court of appeals recognizes 
the importance of flexibility in 
administrative proceedings. If a 
court's findings were complete-
ly decisive, the administrative 
proceeding would represent 
nothing more than a rubber 
stamp on the judicial proceed-
ings. In this way, an agency is 
allowed to consider valuable 
evidence in the form of judicial 
findings, yet maintain its own 
legitimacy and autonomy. 
- Michael Campbell 
